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DISABLING SOCIAL SECURITY
BENEFICIARIES BY LIMITING

ATTORNEY'S FEES: RODRIGUEZ v.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SER VICES
Pursuant to the disability insurance provisions contained in title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act"),' disabled workers and
their families may qualify for and receive disability insurance benefits.2 Although the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the
"Secretary") exercises exclusive decisionmaking authority with respect to the initiation and termination of these benefits,3 such de' 42 U.S.C.A §§ 401-433 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). Title II of the Social Security Act
was originally enacted to provide for survivor's and retiree's benefits; however, in 1956, Congress amended title II to provide disability benefits for insured workers who became medically disabled. See Weinstein, Equality and the Law: Social Security Disability Cases in
the Federal Courts, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 897, 902 (1984).
2 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(b)-(d) (West Supp. 1988); 1 H. MCCORMICK, SOCIAL SECURITY
CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES § 6, at 13 (3d ed. 1983). Disability insurance benefits are provided
for insured workers, their spouses, and their children. See id.; R. MEYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY
38-48 (1975); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.330, 404.350 (1988) (Secretary of Health & Human
Services' definitions of eligible spouses and children). There are two titles within the Social
Security Act which provide for disability benefits: title II and title XVI. See Schweiker v.
Chilicky, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 2463 (1988); F. BLOCH, FEDERAL DIsABLrrY LAW AND PRACTICE 3
(1984). Title XVI provides disability benefits to disabled individuals and their families irrespective of insurance. See id. In contrast, title II disability insurance benefits are only
granted to claimants who are insured by virtue of contributions made to the program, and
who have demonstrated an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1982); see Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2463; F.
BLOCH, supra, at 29. "Title II of the Social Security Act. . .provides for the payment of
insurance benefits to persons who have contributed to the program and who suffer from a
physical or mental disability." Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 2290 (1987).
3 42 U.S.C § 405(a) (1982). Pursuant to section 205(a) of the Act, "the Secretary is
given full authority to make rules and regulations and to establish procedures not inconsistent with the Act." 2 H. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 521, at 31; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.902
(1988) (describing Secretary's decisionmaking authority with respect to benefit entitlement).
Under the authority of the Secretary and the Social Security Administration, individual
state agencies make the initial decision regarding the disability or nondisability of a claimant. See id. § 404.1503(c). This decision is actually a recommendation that is sent to a regional office of the Social Security Administration, which makes the conclusive determination of disability or nondisability for purposes of benefit entitlement. See id. § 404.1503(a),
(d); F. BLOCH, supra note 2, at 236. The 1980 amendments to the Act, requiring a "continu-
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terminations, when unfavorable to claimants, are nonetheless subject to administrative and judicial review.4 Consistent with the
need of ensuring adequate legal representation for claimants seeking review of unfavorable termination decisions, Congress, amending section 206 of the Act, established a contingency fee payment
procedure pursuant to which attorney's fees are provided for in an
amount not in excess of a fixed percentage of the total past-due
benefits awarded a claimant. 5 Additionally, in recognition of the
hardships often suffered by claimants as a result of wrongful tering disability review" ("CDR") program to be maintained by the Social Security Administration, direct these state agencies to review claimants' disability status once every three
years. See Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2463.
4 Social Security Act tit. II, § 205, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1), (b)(2), (g) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986). Section 205(b)(2) reads in pertinent part: "In any case where-(A) an individual is a
recipient of disability insurance benefits ... and ... is determined by the Secretary not to
be entitled to such benefits," such person is entitled to reconsideration or review of such a
decision at the administrative level, either by a state agency or the Secretary. 42 U.S.C. §
405(b)(2) (1982). When a claimant's benefits are initially denied or terminated under the
authority of the Secretary, the appeal of such a decision begins with a de novo reconsideration by the state agency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.909(a) (1988). The claimant, upon an unfavorable
reconsideration by the state agency, may then request a hearing before an administrative
law judge within the Social Security Administration. Id. § 404.929. If this proves unsuccessful, the claimant may seek a review by the Appeals Council. Id. § 404.967. Finally, if the
Appeals Council confirms the Secretary's determination of nondisability, the claimant may
obtain judicial review in federal district court. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982); see also Haberman v. Finch, 418 F.2d 664, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1969) (Q 205, remedial in purpose, should be
broadly construed favoring award of benefits); Drafts v. Celebrezze, 240 F. Supp. 535, 536
(E.D.S.C. 1965) (judicial review of disability "limited to a determination of whether or not
the Secretary's decision is supported by 'substantial evidence' ").
I See 42 U.S.C. § 406(a), (b) (1982). Section 206(b)(1) of the Act provides in pertinent
part:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation,
not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Secretary may... certify the
amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to,
the amount of past-due benefits.
Id. § 406(b)(1).
Section 206(a) provides for a similar payment procedure with respect to proceedings
brought before the Secretary. See id. § 406(a). The purpose of section 206 is both to assure
adequate compensation for attorneys and to prevent the excessive charging of attorney's
fees. See Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830
(1970); see also Davis v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 320 F. Supp. 1293, 1296
(N.D. Miss. 1970) (purpose of assuring attorney's fees to encourage capable representation
of claimants). For an analysis depicting the importance of legal representation for claimants
seeking review, see Bloch, Representation and Advocacy at Non-Adversary Hearings: The
Need ForNon-Adversary Representatives at Social Security DisabilityHearings, 59 WASH.
U.L.Q. 349, 368 (1981).
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mination,6 Congress added section 223(g) of the Act to allow claimants to receive interim benefits during the pendency of their appeals at the administrative level.7 Furthermore, Congress provided
interim benefits in the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform
Act of 1984 (the "Reform Act") 8 for the then-pending post-administrative cases which were remanded to the Secretary for redetermination according to the Reform Act's new medical standard of
review for disability.9 However, Congress failed to address the is6 See

Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2463-64. The Social Security Amendments of 1980, calling

for continuing disability reviews every three years, led to serious hardships for those individuals whose benefits had been wrongfully terminated. See id. at 2463; Weinstein, supra
note 1, at 913. These hardships were classified as "'unnecessary suffering [and] anxiety.'"
See Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting 130 CONG. REc. S11464 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984)
(statement of Sen. Heinz)); see also H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprintedin
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEWS 3038, 3055 (recognizing severe financial and emotional hardships that disabled persons suffered as result of wrongful termination); Note,
Terminating Social Security Disability Benefits: Another Burden for the Disabled?, 12
FORDHAM URB.L.J. 195, 197-98 (1983-84) (noting disabled individuals have died because of
wrongful termination of benefits). The large number of wrongful termination cases seems to
have been caused by excessive responsibilities placed upon the state CDR programs, resulting in low quality decisionmaking. See Collins & Erfle, Social Security Disability Benefits
Reform Act of 1984: Legislative History and Summary of Provisions, Soc. Sc. BULL., Apr.
1985, at 5, 12; Sweeney, Social Security/SSI: Disability Update, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
1114, 1114 (1983).
7 Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-455, § 2, 96 Stat. 2497, 2498 (1982) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 423(g)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV (1986)). Section 223(g) of the Act now
provides in pertinent part:
(1) in any case where(A) an individual is a recipient of disability insurance benefits...
(B) [and] ... such individual is determined not to be entitled to such benefits, and
(C) a timely request for a hearing. . . or for an administrative review prior to
such hearing, is pending...
such individual may elect ... to have the payment of such benefits ... continued [until the Secretary reaches a final determination].
Id. The purpose in enacting section 223(g) was to alleviate the financial burden on claimants
during appeal. See Shoemaker v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 858, 860 (11th Cir. 1988). However, interim benefits are only provided during appeal at the administrative level-that is, the period between an initial determination of nondisability and the Secretary's final decision. See
Thibodeau v. Heckler, 571 F. Supp. 524, 526 (D. Me. 1983).
1 Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794, 1798-99 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.A.).
I Id. § 2(e) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 423 note (Supp. IV 1986) (Election of Payments));
see also id. § 2(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 423(f) (Supp. IV 1986)) (new medical standard of
review for termination of disability benefits); id. § 2(d)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 423 note
(Supp. IV 1986) (Effective Date of 1984 Amendments)) (remanding cases to Secretary). Section 2(e) of the Reform Act provides: "Any individual whose case is remanded to the Secretary pursuant to subsection (d) [of the Reform Act] . . . may elect, in accordance with section 223(g) ... of the Social Security Act, to have payments made beginning with the
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sue of whether interim benefits are considered past-due benefits
for the purpose of computing attorney's fees. 10 The Second,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have maintained that interim benefits are considered past-due benefits for such purpose." Recently,
however, in Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health & Human Services,12
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that
interim benefits are not considered past-due benefits for the calculation of attorney's fees under section 206 of the Act.'"
In Rodriguez, the plaintiff-claimant sought judicial review of
the Secretary's decision terminating her disability insurance benefits.' 4 The district court remanded the case to the Secretary, who,
in October 1986, reversed his prior decision and reinstated Rodriguez' benefits retroactively to January 1983.15 While the case was
on remand, however, Rodriguez had elected to receive interim benefits beginning in November 1984; 16 hence, the Secretary awarded
month in which he makes such election, and ending as under .

.

. section 223(g) ....

42

U.S.C. § 423 note.
10 See Condon v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1988). Congress' failure to address the
issue is not surprising since section 206 was enacted before title II was amended to provide
for interim benefits. See id. at 70. Furthermore, the definition of past-due benefits also preceded the enactment of interim benefits rights. See id. at 72; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1703 (1988).
Section 404.1703 provides that "'[p]ast-due benefits' means the total amount of benefits
payable under title II of the Act to all beneficiaries that has accumulated because of a
favorable administrative or judicial determination or decision, up to but not including the
month the determination or decision is made." Id.
" See, e.g., Gowen v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 613, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1988) (where attorney represented claimants during administrative and judicial appeals process, court could take into
account interim benefits for purposes of awarding attorney's fees for services rendered at
judicial level); Condon, 853 F.2d at 72 (after remand to Secretary resulted in reinstatement
of claimant's benefits, court included interim benefits in calculation of attorney's fees under
§ 206); Shoemaker, 853 F.2d at 861 (interim benefits received by claimant during redetermination could be considered in computing reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to § 206).
12 856 F.2d 338 (1st Cir. 1988).
13 Id. at 341.
14 See id. at 339. For a description of the procedures involved in granting or terminating a claimant's benefits, see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. See generally Note,
Administrative Law-Supreme Court Defers to Congressional Intent in Social Security
Disability Benefit Delays, 60 TuL. L. REV. 205, 206-07 (1985) (illustrating appeals process
following termination).
15See Rodriguez, 856 F.2d at 339. The district court remanded the case to the Secretary pursuant to section 2(d) of the Reform Act. Id. at 339. Section 2(d)(3) provides in
pertinent part: "In the case of a recipient of benefits under title II... (A) who has been
determined not to be entitled to such benefits.., and (B) who was a member of a class
certified on or before September 19, 1984 . . . the court shall remand such a case to the
Secretary." 42 U.S.C. § 423 note (Supp. IV 1986).
10 See Rodriguez, 856 F.2d at 339. These interim benefits were received pursuant to the
specific legislative grant in section 2(e) of the Reform Act. Rodriguez, 856 F.2d at 339; see

1988]

SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFICIARIES

Rodriguez past-due benefits only for the period of January 1983
through October 1984.17 The Secretary then calculated attorneys'
fees as twenty-five percent of these past-due benefits, as authorized under section 206(a) and (b), i8 without taking into account
the previously awarded interim benefits.' 9 The claimant's attorneys
petitioned the district court for increased attorneys' fees and were
awarded an increase based on the interim benefits.2 0 The Secretary
appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, which reversed the district court's ruling and reinstated the Secretary's award.21
In an opinion by Judge Noonan, the Rodriguez court compared the Secretary's position regarding past-due benefits under
other provisions of the Social Security Act 22 to his position regarding interim benefits under title 1H.23 Moreover, analogizing to
supra notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text.
17 See Rodriguez, 856 F.2d at 339. After the Secretary declared Rodriguez disabled, he
awarded her $5,317 in past-due benefits. See id. The Secretary did not award benefits to the
claimant for the period of November 1984 to the month preceding the final decision since
she already had received interim benefits for that period. See id.
11 See id. at 339. The Secretary calculated the fees as twenty-five percent of $5,317, or
approximately $1,300. See id. The Secretary then authorized payment of this amount to the
claimant's counsel. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 406(a), (b) (1982) (authorizing award of
attorney's fees to be taken from claimant's past-due benefits).
"oSee Rodriguez, 856 F.2d at 339.
21 See id. Claimant's attorneys demonstrated to the district court that they had worked

a total of nine hours at the judicial level, incurring expenses of $425. See id. After modifying
the magistrate's report, the court reduced the amount of expenses to $112 and the number
of "judicial hours" spent to 3.25, to be calculated at a rate of eighty-five dollars per hour, for
a total fee, in addition to the $1,300, of $388.25. See id.
11 See id. at 340. The Secretary contended that past-due benefits, for the purpose of
attorney's fees, did not include interim benefits. See id. The Secretary maintained that in
granting the additional $388.25, the district court violated section 206(a) and (b) by giving
more than twenty-five percent of past-due benefits. See id. Instead, the Secretary opined,
the district should have only awarded an additional $29.95. See id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1703 (1988) (Secretary defines past-due benefits as "the total amount of benefits payable under Title II of the Act ... that has accumulated because of a favorable administrative
or judicial determination or decision").
2' See Rodriguez, 856 F.2d at 340. The court was referring to the Secretary's interpretation of past-due benefits as provided for in title XVI of the Act, and the judicial acceptance
thereof. See, e.g., Motley v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 1253, 1254-56 (4th Cir. 1986) (court accepted
Secretary's definition of past-due benefits, directing reduction of past-due benefits by
amount equal to supplemental security benefits granted to claimant pursuant to title XVI);
Detson v. Schweiker, 788 F.2d 372, 375-76 (6th Cir. 1986) (Secretary's definition maintained
past-due benefits as net benefits payable to claimant after reduction of title XVI windfall);
Wheeler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 101, 104-07 (3d Cir. 1986) (Secretary defined past-due benefits
as retroactive disability insurance benefits actually paid to beneficiary minus offsets and
other deductions).
23 See Rodriguez, 856 F.2d at 340. The Secretary reasoned that past-due benefits are
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24 a title XVI benefits case, the court reasoned
Bowen v. Galbreath,
that congressional silence indicated a legislative intent to deny the
awarding of attorney's fees out of interim benefits.25 Thus, in the
absence of any overriding legislation, the court found that the language of section 206(a) accorded broad authority to the Secretary,26 and held his definition of past-due benefits controlling, having legislative force stemming from the statutory delegation of
power."
In awarding attorney's fees for the representation of Social Security claimants, it is suggested that courts recognize not only the
desire to protect beneficiaries from excessive legal fees, but also
the need to provide effective incentives for attorneys in order to
ensure claimants adequate legal representation. Although the Rodriguez court properly acknowledged the importance of considering
the Secretary's definition of past-due benefits, it is submitted that
the court was unduly deferential to his view, and consequently abrogated the intent and dual policy concerns of the legislature. This
Comment will describe the policy repercussions likely to result
from adoption of the Rodriguez court's view on interim benefits. It
is suggested that implementation of the holding could frustrate the
those benefits 'payable' and which have 'accumulated'; therefore, benefits which have already been paid out on an interim basis cannot be past-due. See id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1703 (1988) (Secretary's definition of past-due benefits). But see Condon v. Bowen, 853
F.2d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that Secretary has not adopted any regulations explicitly
addressing "issue of whether attorney's fees can be based on interim benefits"). The Condon
court stated that while section 404.1703 defines past-due benefits, this definition was issued
before interim benefits were incorporated into the Act. Id.
24 108 S. Ct. 892, 894 (1988). In Galbreath,an attorney sought fees of twenty-five percent of the total amount of title XVI past-due benefits awarded to his client. See id. at 893.
The GalbreathCourt held that Congress, by incorporating very similar provisions of title II
into title XVI, but excluding section 206, did not wish to have attorney's fees deducted from
supplemental security benefits. See id. at 894-95.
2 See Rodriguez, 856 F.2d at 341. The court held that the Galbreath analogy controlled. See id.
26 Id. at 341; see 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1982). Section 206(a) provides in pertinent part
that "[t]he Secretary may, by rule and regulation, prescribe the maximum fees which may
be charged." Id. However, the court did acknowledge that the explicit statutory authority of
the Secretary regarding attorney's fees related only to fees for services rendered at the administrative level. See Rodriguez, 856 F.2d at 341.
2 Rodriguez, 856 F.2d at 341; see Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981).
In Schweiker, the Court evaluated the Secretary's authority with respect to medicaid plans.
Id. at 43. The Court maintained that the Secretary was explicitly delegated substantial authority; "the Secretary's definition is entitled to 'legislative effect' because, '[iun a situation
of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term."' Id. at 44 (quoting Batterton v. Francis,
432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977)).
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aforementioned goals and ultimately lead to the inequitable administration of the Social Security laws.
MISDIRECTED ACCEPTANCE OF SECRETARY'S DEFINITION

In promulgating title II of the Social Security Act, Congress
delegated to the Secretary the power to make all rules, regulations,
and procedures necessary to carry out the provisions of the subchapter.2 8 Therefore, when resolving issues concerning the interpretation and execution of the attorney's fees and interim benefits
provisions of title II, it is uncontroverted that courts must give
deference to the views of the Secretary.2 9 However, when the Secretary's position or interpretation contravenes the purpose and design of the statute, courts must look beyond the Secretary's interpretation in order to effectuate the policy concerns of the
legislature.,3 0
The Rodriguez court, in accepting the Secretary's position on
interim benefits, held that benefits which are "payable" and have
"accumulated" do not include benefits that have already been
paid.3 The court's basis for adopting such a view was derived from
a comparison of title IE interim benefits with title XVI interim assistance benefits. 2 In Bowen v. Galbreath,3 the Supreme Court
28

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1982). Section 205(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part:

"The Secretary shall have full power and authority to make rules and regulations and to
establish procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter, which are necessary or appropriate to carry out such provisions . . . ." Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)
(1982) (Secretary may make rules governing recognition of agents and prescribe maximum
fees for services rendered).
" See, e.g., Wheeler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[Blecause Congress
has delegated to the Secretary the responsibility for administering the complex programs,
we must defer to her construction."); Lugo v. Schweiker, 776 F.2d 1143, 1147 (3d Cir. 1985)
("[W]e must defer to the Secretary's interpretation so long as it is reasonable."); see also
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (describing
agency's controlling weight in statutory construction); Detson v. Schweiker, 788 F.2d 372,
374-75 (6th Cir. 1986) (Secretary's interpretation of statute given great deference).
30 See Shoemaker v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 858, 861 (11th Cir. 1988). Courts are not required
to accept an agency's interpretation in situations where a frustration of congressional policy
would result. Id. at 861; see also Fagner v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 541, 543 (9th Cir. 1985) (no
requirement to defer to agency's interpretation since its "interpretation is not always infallible"). See generally Kovar v. Heckler, 622 F. Supp 967, 970 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (Secretary's
regulation of past-due benefits not consistent with policy goals of giving attorneys incentive
to represent claimants).
11 See Rodriguez, 856 F.2d at 340-41. The Secretary has also taken this position without success in other similar cases. See, e.g., Gowen v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1988);
Condon v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1988).
2 See Rodriguez, 856 F.2d at 341. The Rodriguez court considered Congress' silence on
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reasoned that Congress' omission of a fee provision from title XVI
clearly manifested a refusal to authorize the application of section
206.11 Similarly, the Rodriguez court deemed Congress' omission
from the Reform Act of a section 206 payment procedure indicative of a legislative intent not to authorize such a procedure with
respect to the interim benefits received under it23 It is submitted,
however, that the Rodriguez court erroneously predicated its assumptions about Congress' inaction on a cursory analysis of Galbreath. In Galbreath, the Supreme Court specifically stated that
section 206 would have applied if a claim for title II benefits instead of title XVI benefits was involved. 6 Section 223(g), through
which the Reform Act ultimately dispenses interim benefits, 37 is a
title II provision; therefore, section 206 should have applied in
Rodriguez if interim benefits are classified as past-due benefits.3 8
Moreover, Congress' reason for not granting attorney's fees based
on an award of title XVI benefits was founded upon an exclusive,
specific intent to channel the funds elsewhere." This was not the
the issue of attorney's fees with respect to title XVI benefits analogous to its silence regarding title II interim benefits. See id.; Bowen v. Galbreath, 108 S. Ct. 892, 893 (1988).
3 108 S. Ct. 892 (1988).
" Id. at 895. The court reached its position by looking to the legislative history regarding attorney's fees and title XVI benefits. See id. at 894. The House of Representatives
Report stated:
Where an individual ... is represented before the Secretary by an attorney,
the provisions of the cash social security program (pertaining to attorney fees)
would be applicable except that there would be no withholding of attorney fees
from such individual's benefits. [This] would be contrary to the purpose of the
program.
H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4989, 5142 [hereinafter HousE REPORT].
" See Rodriguez, 856 F.2d at 341; see also McCarthy v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 793 F.2d 741, 745 (6th Cir. 1986) (Congress never incorporated § 206 payment provision into title XVI).
36 Galbreath, 108 S. Ct. at 894; see also 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1982) (attorney's fees to be
deducted from past-due benefits awarded to claimant).
" See supra notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text (§ 2(e) of the Reform Act grants interim benefits "in accordance with" § 2 2 3(g) of the Social Security Act).
"s See 42 U.S.C. § 406(a), (b) (1982); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1703 (1988).
" See Wheeler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1986). The Wheeler court explained that SSI (title XVI) benefits which are awarded may be used to reimburse state
agencies already providing claimants with assistance. Id. To do otherwise would contravene
the Congressional intent of encouraging state assistance programs. Id.; see also HousE REPORT, supra note 34, at 3 (withholding attorney's fees from SSI benefits would defeat purpose of statute). See generally Rivers v. Schweiker, 692 F.2d 871, 872 (2d Cir. 1982)
(describing procedures for state repayment from past-due benefits awarded), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1088 (1983).
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case with interim or past-due benefits under title 11.40

The Rodriguez court further supported its acceptance of the
Secretary's definition by finding that the language of section 206
delegated nearly absolute authority to the Secretary to prescribe
attorney's fees.41 However, it is suggested that the court failed to
acknowledge more important language contained in the provision.
Section 206 states in detail that the Secretary shall follow certain
statutory guidelines in granting attorney's fees where past-due
benefits are involved. 42 Thus, the Secretary's authority over attorney's fees is not absolute; rather, it is circumscribed in cases where
past-due benefits have been awarded.43
REPERCUSSIONS OF NOT APPLYING FEE FORMULA TO INTERIM
BENEFITS

Congress amended section 20644 to resolve two significant
problems concerning the legal representation of disability claimants seeking section 205 review. 45 First, the legislature sought to
remedy a problem regarding excessive attorney's fees.46 Congress
40 See Galbreath, 108 S. Ct. at 893. Title II is an insurance program and claimants
receive benefits based on their insured status. See id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, 423(a), (c), (d)(1982
& Supp. IV 1986).
" See Rodriguez, 856 F.2d at 341. The court, quoting section 206(a), stated that the
Secretary may "'by rule and regulation, prescribe the maximum fees which may be
charged."' Id.
42 42 U.S.C. § 406(a), (b)(1982).
'3 See Guido v. Schweiker, 775 F.2d 107, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1985). Furthermore, the Secretary cannot award attorney's fees for services rendered at the judicial level since this is for
the court's determination. See id.
" See Social Security Act tit. II, § 206(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 406(a), (b) (1982). The 1965
and 1968 amendments to the Act provided for the authorization of attorney's fees, not in
excess of twenty-five percent, to be taken out of the total amount of past-due benefits owed
the claimant due to a favorable judicial or administrative determination. Id.; see also 20
C.F.R. § 404.1720-30 (1988) (regulations promulgating payment procedures).
4'See Hearings on H.R. 6675 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 513 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Hearings].
This amendment is designed to alleviate two problems that have arisen with
respect to representation of claimants by attorneys.... [First, there exists a] need
to encourage effective legal representation of claimants .... Another problem that
has arisen is that attorneys have on occasion charged what appeared to be inordinately large fees for representing claimants ....
Id. (statement of Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare); see also Hopkins v. Cohen, 390 U.S.
530, 534 (1968) (addressing Congress' desire to reduce contingency fee arrangements); Davis
v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 320 F. Supp. 1293, 1296 (N.D. Miss. 1970) (purpose
of § 206 to dispense with excessive fees, but not to extent of causing disincentive among
attorneys).
4" See Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1985). The Watford court
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also acknowledged the need to assure claimants effective and adequate representation by counsel.47
With respect to the latter policy concern, Congress recognized
some reluctance on the part of attorneys to represent disability
claimants. 48 By amending section 206, Congress alleviated this dis-

incentive problem by guaranteeing to attorneys reasonable compensation for services rendered. 49 This action furthered Congress'
policy goals by enabling claimants to obtain adequate and effective
representation by counsel.50 Interim benefits, however, were created to serve a different purpose.51
Because of the 1980 amendments to the Social Security Act,52
many claimants experienced wrongful termination of their disability benefits, only to have them reinstated after appeal.5 3 The hardacknowledged the legislature's concern about contingency fee arrangements between claimants and attorneys because they often resulted in the "inordinate" deprivation of benefits
otherwise payable to the claimant. Id.
"I See Condon v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1988). Congress was seeking to encourage effective legal representation of claimants "by assuring attorneys that they would
receive adequate pay for representing social security claimants." Id. (citing 1965 Hearings,
supra note 45, at 513).
'8 See Guadamuz v. Heckler, 662 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1986), rev'd on
other grounds, 859 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1988). The difficulty encountered by attorneys in collecting fees from claimants prompted Congress to pass the direct payment provision under
section 206. See id.
" See Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830
(1970). In Dawson, the court alluded to the Department of Health, Education & Welfare's
view concerning the need to guarantee attorney compensation, recognizing that since awards
were sometimes made to claimants without the knowledge of their attorneys, the attorneys
might never receive payment of their fees. Id.
11 See Cora-Silva v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 642 F. Supp. 931, 933 (D.
Mass. 1986).
[I]ntent behind section [206(b)(1)] is to provide adequate compensation for attorneys handling disability claims, thereby ensuring that claimants are able to encourage competent counsel to press their claims ....
Section [206(b)(1)] also reflects a Congressional judgment that SSA should administer the direct payment of
attorney's fees, thereby avoiding problems of fee collection from the claimant.
Id.
52 See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
5'2 See Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 441
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Faced with "unpredicted and extraordinary growth in costs and caseloads, disincentives for beneficiaries to return to work,
and inadequate and sometimes inequitable administrative procedures," Congress attempted
to "[strengthen] the integrity of the disability programs" through the 1980 amendments. S.
REP. No. 408, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
1277, 1312.
" See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 912. The burdensome review procedures thrust upon
the states as a result of the 1980 amendments, as well as a stricter standard established for
disability qualification, contributed to the vast increase in wrongful termination cases. See
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ships which often accompanied these terminations prompted Congress to enact section 223(g), through which the 1984 Reform Act
later funnelled interim relief to its special remand claimants. 4
This provision gave claimants the option to receive interim benefits while their cases were on appeal at the administrative level. 5
However, it did not address the issue of whether interim benefits
are to be considered past-due benefits for the purpose of awarding
attorney's fees pursuant to section 206. 56
To deny the application of the section 206 fee formula to interim benefits would be to undermine the "spirit" of section 206,
ultimately causing the inequitable administration of the interim
benefits provisions.5 7 Specifically, such a practice would cause the
compensation rates of attorneys to be severely diminished,5 8
thereby resurrecting the disincentive problems section 206 was
originally intended to alleviate. 9 Additionally, it is submitted that
id. at 913; see also Thibodeau v. Heckler, 571 F. Supp. 524, 526 (D. Me. 1983) (nearly 65%
of all appeals resulted in claimants having benefits reinstated); Note, Social Security Administrationin Crisis:Non-Acquiescence and Social Insecurity, 52 BROoKLYN L. Rav. 89,
98-101 (1986) (new disability standard and zealous implementation of CDR legislation led to
termination crisis).
" See Condon v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1988). By permitting the continuation
of payments during appeals, Congress intended to mitigate the financial and emotional
hardships that would otherwise be suffered by disabled persons. Id. The Reform Act provided for "'a more humane and understandable application and appeal process for disability applicants and beneficiaries appealing termination of their benefits.'" Taddonio v. Heckler, 603 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (quoting H. RE'. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
2, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. Naws 3038, 3039); see also Thibodeau, 571
F. Supp. at 526 ("Congress has attempted to minimize the disparate impact of wide decisional variations among the states and the ALJs"); Weinstein, supra note 1, at 913 (circumstances causing death and suicide because of loss of benefits).
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 423(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also Thibodeau, 571 F. Supp. at
525 (§ 223(g) applies only during administrative appeals process).
Il See Condon, 853 F.2d at 71. The Condon court found the legislative history of section 223(g) silent with respect to attorney's fees. Id.
'1 See Gowen v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 613, 619 (8th Cir. 1988); Shoemaker v. Bowen, 853
F.2d 858, 860-61 (11th Cir. 1988); Condon, 853 F.2d at 70-71.
's See, e.g., Condon, 853 F.2d at 70. The Condon court calculated the attorney's effective awards under the Secretary's interpretation as being $40.51 per hour and $27.08 per
hour in the attorney's respective cases when a reasonable rate of compensation would have
been $100 per hour. Id.
59 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. "'[I]n cases where the Court eventually awards a fee to claimant's counsel, a procedure which artificially reduces the amount of
benefits available from which to make such an award represents a strong disincentive for
lawyers to represent Social Security claimants."' Carlisi v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 583 F. Supp. 135, 138 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (quoting Burnett v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 563 F. Supp. 789, 793 (W.D. Ark. 1983), afl'd sub nom. Burnett v. Heckler,
756 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1985)).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:139

the nonapplication of section 206 would create a new dilemma involving favoritism among claimants. Faced with a choice between
representing claimants who have elected to receive interim benefits
and claimants who have not, an attorney is likely to opt for the
latter,6 0 since the latter claimants have a larger pool of
funds-past-due benefits-from which the attorney is to be
granted his fixed percentage share. 1 In addition to these policy
ramifications, the language of sections 206 and 223(g) further mandates the classification of interim benefits as past-due benefits.2
Interim benefits have been described as "loans" granted to
claimants that need only be repaid if and when the Secretary confirms his initial decision of nondisability.6 3 This analogy is logically
consistent with section 206 and the regulations promulgated pursuant to it. 4 Section 206 provides that an attorney may receive a
percentage of "the total amount of past-due benefits to which the
claimant is entitled.' 65 In light of the potential for recoupment,
interim benefits given to a claimant are funds to which the claimant is not entitled until a favorable decision is granted. 6 There'0 See Gowen, 855 F.2d at 619.
11See Shoemaker, 853 F.2d at 861. Moreover, the position held by the Secretary. (1)
causes a conflict by putting an attorney in the position of jeopardizing his fiduciary duties
when he advises his client not to accept the interim benefits; and (2) forces the claimant to
forego receiving much needed interim benefits in order to ensure adequate representation.
See Condon v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1988).
62 See Shoemaker v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 858, 861 (11th Cir. 1988); Condon, 853 F.2d at 70.
13 See Condon, 853 F.2d at 70. The Condon court viewed the repayment requirement of
interim benefits as indicative of only a temporary right to these funds. Id. at 71; see Shoemaker, 853 F.2d at 858; 42 U.S.C. § 423(g)(2)(a) (1982). Section 223(g)(2)(a) of the Act
provides in pertinent part:
If an individual elects to have the payment of his benefits continued for an additional period under paragraph (1), and the final decision of the Secretary affirms
the determination that he is not entitled to such benefits, any benefits paid under
this subchapter pursuant to such election (for months in such additional period)
shall be considered overpayments for all purposes of this subchapter ....
Id. (emphasis added).
See Gowen v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 613, 619 (8th Cir. 1988); Condon, 853 F.2d at 70. The
Condon court noted the persuasiveness of this argument with respect to section 206 and
proceeded to resolve the ambiguity inherent in section 206-not inconsistent with the lower
court's loan simile. See id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.501 (1988). Section 404.501 provides in
part: "As used in this subpart, the term 'overpayment' includes a payment in excess of the
amount due under title H of the Act.... [and] a payment pursuant to section 205(n) of the
Act in an amount in excess of the amount to which the individual is entitled under section.
223 of the Act ....." Id. (emphasis added).
65 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
66 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.303 (1988). "'Entitled'
means that a person has applied and has
proven his or her right to benefits for a period of time." Id. Therefore, a claimant is not
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fore, when the claimant does become entitled to these benefits by
way of a favorable decision, the attorney should then be granted
his statutorily prescribed fee out of the total amount.67
CONCLUSION

Entitlement to interim benefits is appropriately factored into
the calculation of attorney's fees under section 206 of the Social
Security Act. To hold otherwise would promote an inequitable administration of the Act's interim benefits provisions, as well as ultimately disregard the legislature's intent to encourage adequate and
effective representation of disability claimants. Due to the deleterious impact of the Secretary's view upon the individual claimant, it
is suggested that the Supreme Court settle the existing conflict
among the circuits expeditiously.
Leonard Violi

"entitled" to interim benefits until he or she has proven a right to them. See Shoemaker,
853 F.2d at 861.
"' See Shoemaker v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 858, 861 (11th Cir. 1988).

